We consider the problem of communication over a multi-path network in the presence of a causal adversary. The limited-view causal adversary is able to, based on the current and past observations, eavesdrop on a subset of links and also jam on a potentially overlapping subset of links. The goal is to ensure that the communication takes place reliably and secretly. We study two adversarial models -additive and overwrite jamming. For both adversarial models, we consider communication models both without and with passive feedback from decoder to encoder, i.e., the encoder sees everything that the decoder sees. The problem assumes transmissions are in the large alphabet regime. For both types of jamming models, we find the capacity under three scenarios -reliability without feedback, reliability and secrecy without feedback, and reliability with feedback. We observe that in comparison to the non-causal setting the capacity with a causal adversary is strictly increased for a wide variety of parameter settings, and present our intuition through several examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following example of a communication problem. Alice wishes to wirelessly transmit a message m to receiver Bob by communicating over C different frequencies. Their communication is intercepted by a limited-view adversary Calvin who has his receiver tuned to subset Z R of the frequencies, and can jam a potentially overlapping subset Z W of frequencies by adding transmissions on them. Due to the online nature of the channel, Calvin can only see the signal up to the current time to maliciously determine his jamming strategy for the current time instant. We wish to answer questions of the following form: "Without knowing which frequencies Calvin is monitoring/jamming, what is the maximum communication rate at which Bob can decode Alice's message successfully, while keeping the message secret from Calvin?". This example corresponds to a model in which Alice wishes to communicate reliably and secretly with Bob over a channel with an eavesdropper/additive jammer. A variant of the problem is when, additionally, Alice can also hear the channel outputs (she too is monitoring all C frequencies, and therefore has passive feedback). In this variant we wish to understand whether this knowledge can improve the best possible rate.
We model these problems as those of communication over a noiseless multi-path network consisting of C parallel links between the sender and the receiver. As mentioned above, the Qiaosheng (Eric) Zhang, Mayank Bakshi, and Sidharth Jaggi are with Chinese University of Hong Kong; Swanand Kadhe and Alex Sprintson are with Texas A&M University. The work of Mayank Bakshi and Sidharth Jaggi was partially supported by a grant from University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. AoE/E-02/08). The work of Alex Sprintson was partially supported by the NSF under grant CNS-0954153 and by the AFOSR under contract No. FA9550-13-1-0008. adversary Calvin can eavesdrop on a subset Z R and jam on a subset Z W . Subsets Z RW , Z RO and Z W O 1 represent the links that Calvin can both eavesdrop on and jam, only eavesdrop on (but not jam) and only jam (but not eavesdrop on) respectively. The set Z R then represents the set of all links that Calvin can eavesdrop on (i.e. the union of the links in Z RW and Z RO ), and the set Z W represents the set of all links that Calvin can jam (i.e. the union of the links in Z RW and Z W O ). In addition, the sizes of Z RW , Z RO and Z W O are bounded from above by z rw , z ro and z wo -the values of these bounds are known to Alice and Bob, but the actual sets of links corresponding to Z RW , Z RO and Z W O are unknown a priori. The adversarial vectorz = (z rw , z ro , z wo ) measures Calvin's power. Moreover, Calvin also knows Alice and Bob's encoding and decoding schemes so that he may mimic Alice's behaviour so as to confuse Bob. We consider a causal constraint on Calvin's behaviour, i.e., Calvin can only use the knowledge of symbols up to the current time slot to decide his jamming strategy.
Related work
Reliable communication: The problem of reliable communication (with no secrecy constraints) against a malicious eavesdropping adversary has been well-studied in the past. The maximum possible rate has been characterized under various settings -both causal and non-causal. The non-causal setting is relatively well understood both in the classical error-correction setup [1] - [4] and the network error correction setting [5] - [8] .
A key feature of these results is that in many of these models, Calvin can decrease the capacity by twice the number of links he controls, by "pushing" Alice's transmissions towards the "nearest plausible transmission", thereby inflicting "doubledamage". This heuristic also suggests an intuitive scheme for Bob's decoder -try to detect as many corrupted links as possible and treat those as erasures -in this case Calvin's actions would only cause "single damage". Critically, Calvin's ability to cause double damage depends on his ability to be able to see the full transmission for each link in Z R before determining the optimal jamming strategy for Z W .
In contrast, in the causal setting, by using stochastic encoding, the adversary may not be able to predict some of the future symbols, which can then be used to detect the set Z W . Causal adversaries for classical channel coding and network coding problems have also been well studied [9] , [10] . In [11] , the authors consider causal, omniscient adversaries for multicast networks, and characterize precise conditions under which any positive rate is achievable. Further, they also provide some upper and lower bounds on the rates. However, the question of characterizing the capacity in general networks containing malicious jammers remains open in the main.
Reliable and secret communication: The problem of both reliable and secure communication over a network has also received considerable attention in the literature. For reliable, secure communication, [5] characterize the capacity when z ro = z wo = 0. In [6] , the authors consider another extreme when the set of edges that are eavesdropped and jammed are disjoint, i.e., z rw = 0. (See [7] for a survey on this topic.) The capacity for a generalz = (z rw , z ro , z wo ) for a non-causal adversary with no feedback has been considered in a previous work [8] by the authors of this work.
Another model that is related to our setup is that of an adversarial wiretap (AWTP) channel [12] , wherein the adversary can eavesdrop up to a given fraction of symbols sent over a channel, and can jam another (possibly intersecting) fraction of symbols based on what he eavesdrops. There are two key differences from our work: (i) the authors only consider the problem of additive jamming, and (ii) the capacity characterization is parametrized with "coarser granularity", in that instead of parametrizing the problem in terms of (z rw , z ro , z wo ), the authors parametrize it in terms of (z rw + z ro , z rw + z wo ), i.e., in terms of the total number of eavesdropped and jammed links.
Another problem that is closely related to ours is that of Secure Message Transmission (SMT) [13] , [14] . Under SMT, a sender aims to communicate a message reliably and secretly to the receiver over multiple parallel links out of which a fraction of links are eavesdropped and another (possibly intersecting) fraction are jammed. There are a several differences from our model: (i) The SMT problem focusses on computing a lower bound on the number of links that are required for reliable and secret communication of one message symbol, and usually do not provide information-theoretically tight capacity characterizations, (ii) most schemes are multi-round, 2-way protocols where the receiver can (actively) talk to the sender (though some protocols are indeed 1-way), (iii) the problem parametrization is again in terms of (z rw + z ro , z rw + z wo ).
Our contributions
We consider the problem of causal jamming with an optional secrecy requirement. Taking a cue from our prior work [8] , we consider a finer characterization of the adversary's power by classifying his controlled links into readonly, write-only, and read-and-write subsets. We examine this problem in two settings -additive and overwrite jamming. The motivation for an additive adversary comes from wireless networks where the adversary may add his own signal to the transmitted signal. On the other hand, overwrite adversaries model adversarial actions in a wired network, where the adversary is likely to completely replace the true transmitted packets with fake packets of his choice. 2 In the setting without feedback, Theorems 1-4 state the "reliable capacity", i.e., when secrecy is not required, and Theorems 5 and 6 obtain "reliable and secret capacity", i.e., when the communication goals include a secrecy requirement. In the setting where passive feedback is available to the encoder, we characterize the reliable capacity in Theorems 7 and 8, but leave open the question of reliable and secret capacity in this setting 3 .
II. KEY IDEAS
The techniques used in this paper build upon the ideas introduced in [5], [8] . In this section, we present a short intuitive overview of some of these ideas via toy examples.
A. Ideas for achievability 1) Reed-Solomon codes: The application of Reed-Solomon codes [1] (or in fact, any MDS code) to network errorcorrection is well-studied. These are particularly useful when the parameters z rw , z ro , and z wo correspond to a "strong adversary" that can choose both the set Z W and the corrupted codewords in a "worst-case" manner. 4 If Bob were able to detect the set Z W with high probability, this would allow him to treat the set Z W as "erasures", thus enabling a rate of C z w to be achievable -indeed, this is what some of the schemes we present attempt to do. 5 2) Pairwise-hashing: When the adversary has limited knowledge of the transmitted codewords, in some settings a pairwise-hashing scheme is useful in detecting the set Z W and enabling treating the corrupted set of links as erasures [5] .The following example presents the main intuition here.
Example 1 (Limited-view non-causal adversary [8] ). Consider a network with three links L 1 , L 2 and L 3 , and an adversary Calvin that can both read and write on exactly one link, i.e., z rw = 1 and z wo = z ro = 0. Even though the zero-error capacity of this network is C 2z w = 1, we argue that in the vanishing error probability setup, the link Z RW can be detected and the rate is C z rw = 2. The codeword sent on the link L i consists of three parts -the i-th symbol from a (3, 2) Reed-Solomon codeword U i , a random key K i , and hash values
for a suitably designed non-linear hash function h(·, ·). Upon receiving the codewords, Bob checks consistency within each pair of links (L i , L j ) by verifying if the received values satisfy both H ij = h(K i , U j ) and H ji = h(K j , U i ). Without loss of generality, assume that Calvin choses Z RW = {L 1 } (unknown 3 The problem of characterizing the capacity for reliability and secrecy in the presence of feedback turns out to be surprisingly hard. It is not clear whether the "standard" approach of mixing random keys with the message is optimal. 4 The simplest example of a strong adversary is an omniscient one, i.e., when zr = C. However, the exact parameter settings that correspond to a strong adversary depend on the flavour of the problem being considered, e.g. causal vs non-causal, overwrite vs additive etc. 5 It is important here to make a distinction between zero error probability (i.e., robustness to worst-case errors) and vanishing error probability requirements. In the former case one can use the Singleton bound [2] to see that the best achievable rate is C 2zw regardless of what the adversary knows. However, the Singleton bound requires Calvin to know the entire transmission. Hence, in the latter setup, a higher rate may be achievable if the adversary has limited eavesdropping power.
to Alice and Bob) and corrupts (U 1 , K 1 , H 11 , H 12 , H 13 ). Note that since Calvin does not know the values of K 2 and K 3 , it can be shown that the probability that he can satisfy the checks for H 21 and H 31 is small if he choses to change U 1 . On the other hand, links L 2 and L 3 cross-verify all of their mutual hashes successfully, thus isolating L 1 as the corrupted link. As a result, Bob can successfully decode the message by treating U 1 as an erasure for the Reed-Solomon code.
The scheme in the Example 1 exploits the adversary knowing only a subset of what the decoder sees. In the problems considered in this paper, the additional assumption of causality further limits his view and enables a higher rate. For example, in the three link network above, even if we permit the adversary to read all the links (i.e., z ro = 2, z rw = 1), the fact that the adversary does not know the random keys K 1 , K 2 , K 3 while perturbing the selected U i prevent him from being able to deterministically match the corresponding pairwise hashes. This allows the decoder to detect the corrupted link.
We use a similar idea as above in the setting with passive feedback (i.e., the encoder overhears all past symbols received by the decoder before transmitting the current symbol). In this case, the rate C z w is possible for an even larger set of parameters. The intuition is that the encoder can use his feedback to first determine which links have been corrupted by the adversary and then convey this information to the decoder by sending values consistent with the hash function only on the uncorrupted links (and inconsistent values on others).
3) Mixing keys for secrecy: In the setting where information theoretic secrecy is demanded in addition to reliability, we use standard one-time pad arguments that mix the message with random keys. Since the adversary can see up to z r links, as long as the key rate is at least z r , we show that the secrecy requirement is met. The error correcting code is chosen so that both the message and the key are decoded by the receiver. As a result, as long as the overall rate decreases by z r , both secrecy and reliability are simultaneously met.
B. Ideas for the converse 1) Cut-set bound: Since the adversary can corrupt z w links, he can replace the codewords on the links in Z R by uniformly random symbols independent of the original codewords. By a simple argument based on Fano's inequality, one can conclude that no rate higher than C z w is possible if the error probability must vanish to 0.
2) A symmetrization argument [9] : A tighter converse than the above can be obtained when the adversary is "powerful enough". For example, in the setting without feedback, if the adversary can corrupt at least half of the links, no positive rate is possible. The argument here is similar to the Singleton Bound [2] and allows for stochastic encoding as well. The following example illustrates the idea.
Example 2 (Symmetrization with a causal adversary). Consider a three link network under attack from a causal adversary with z rw = 2 and z wo = z ro = 0. It is straightforward to see that the pairwise hashing scheme can be foiled by the adversary -he can ensure that the two links in Z W satisfy each other's hashes and thus there is no reliable way for the decoder to determine the uncorrupted link. More generally, for any coding scheme, the adversary can follow a symmetrization strategy as follows. Suppose the encoder maps message m to codewords x 1 , x 2 , x 3 according to an encoder conditional probability distribution p X1,X2,X3|M . 6 The adversary first chooses a message m 0 uniformly at random from the set of possible messages and draws codewords x 0 1 , x 0 2 , x 0 3 according to the conditional probability distribution p X1,X2,X3|M (x 0 1 , x 0 2 , x 0 3 |m 0 ). Next, the adversary chooses Z W to be either {L 1 } or {L 2 , L 3 } with equal probability and replaces the codewords (x i : i 2 Z W ) by (x 0 i : i 2 Z W ). Now, from the decoder's point of view, given the received codewords y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , the messages m and m 0 are equally likely. Thus, the decoder cannot reliably determine whether the true message is m or m 0 and as a result the error probability is bounded away from 0 for any code of positive rate.
When feedback is present, an argument similar to the above holds, albeit for a smaller set of adversarial parameters. With feedback, since the code operates over multiple rounds, the adversary needs to be sufficiently powerful to be able to fool the decoder even when the encoder knows the received codewords on the links in Z W .
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In our setting, the multi-path network consists of C parallel, directed links L 1 , L 2 , · · · , L C . In networks with equal link capacities, each link is of unit capacity (one bit per channel use). For a general unequal link capacity network, the capacity of link L i is denoted by ⇤ i bits per channel use. The sum capacity of an unequal link capacity network is denoted bŷ
⇤ i . We also consider separately a setting with passive feedback available causally at the transmitter.
We begin by formally describing the encoder, decoder, and possible adversarial actions for a code of block length n. For simplicity, we describe the details only for the equal link capacity case, and briefly present the results for the unequal link capacity case only in one setting (described later).
In the following, X and Y are binary C ⇥ n matrices that respectively denote the collection of transmitted and received codewords across all links. The (i, j)-th entry X i,j (resp. Y i,j ) corresponds to the bit transmitted (resp. received) at the j-th time step on the link L i . LetX i andỸ i denote the i-th row of X and Y respectively. Finally, for any J ✓ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let X(J) and Y (J) denote the C ⇥ |J| sub-matrices of X and Y respectively consisting only of columns that appear in J.
Encoder: The transmitter Alice wishes to communicate an nR-bit message m, where R stands for the message rate. The message m is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} nR . To perform stochastic encoding, Alice may generate a random key k, which is uniformly distributed over a finite field F 2 t . We consider two broad settings -without feedback and with passive feedback. In the first setting, the codeword X is only a function of the message and the random key, i.e., X = (m, k) for some deterministic function (·, ·). In the setting with feedback, the encoder has causal knowledge of the past received symbols at the decoder. Thus, the encoder map takes the form X({j}) = j (m, k, Y ({1, 2, . . . , j 1})) for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n for an arbitrary collection of deterministic functions 1 (·, ·, ·), 2 (·, ·, ·), . . . , n (·, ·, ·).
Decoder: The decoder receives the code matrix Y and outputs a reconstructionm = (Y ) for some decoding function of the form :
Adversary: Out of the C links of the multi-path network, the adversary Calvin is able to eavesdrop (but not jam) a subset Z RO of size z ro , jam (but not eavesdrop) a subset Z W O of size z wo , both eavesdrop and jam a subset Z RW of size z rw . Calvin's power is measured by the adversarial vectorz = (z rw , z ro , z wo ). The encoding and decoding strategies are known to Calvin. However, the two end users do not know how Calvin chooses Z RO , Z W O and Z RW in advance.
• Additive vs. Overwrite Jamming: An additive jammer may induce additive bias on the transmitted codeword. Assume the codeword transmitted on L i is ! X i and the bias is
On the other hand, an overwrite adversary can overwrite the transmitted codeword by its own one directly. If the codeword is ! X i and the bias is
We restrict the adversary to be causal, i.e., the adversary is only allowed to jam the symbol of current time slot based on the observations of current and past time slots. More specifically, at any given time t, given a C ⇥ n code matrix X, the adversary can use the knowledge of only the first t symbols from rows in subset Z R = Z RW [Z RO in order to jam the t-th symbols from the rows in Z W = Z RW [Z W O . 8 • Reliability and Security: Instead of zero-error probability, we aim to achieve an asymptotically negligible error probability. The communication is reliable if for any " > 0, by choosing n large enough, there exists a code of block length n such that the error probability P e = P r[m 6 =m] < ".
In terms of security, we aim to achieve the informationtheoretically perfect secrecy. To achieve security, the mutualinformation between the message and Calvin's observation should be zero, i.e. I (M ; X ZR ) = 0. Here X ZR corresponds to the transmissions on the links Calvin observes. 9
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We now present the main results and sketch their proofs, with full proofs deferred to [15] . We group our results into three parts -reliability without feedback, reliability and secrecy without feedback, and reliability with feedback. For each part, we discuss additive and overwrite jamming separately.
Additive Jamming
Overwrite Jamming Fig. 1 : The rate regions for additive and over-write causal jamming adversaries (Theorem 1 and 2): for additive (resp. overwrite) jamming, the pentahedron V3OV2V5V4 (resp. OV4V5V2V7V6) represents the positive-rate regime, while the polyhedron V3V4V5V1 (resp. V1V3V5V4V7V6) represents the zero-rate regime.
A. Reliability without feedback
For both additive and overwrite jammers, the positive-rate regimes are defined, respectively, as Z add pos,nf = {z : z wo + 2z rw < C} , and Z ow pos,nf = {z : 2z wo + 2z rw < C} . The zero-rate regimes for each type of jammer equals the complement of the positive-rate regime. For equal and unequal link capacity networks, for anyz = (z rw , z ro , z wo ) such that z rw +z ro +z wo  C, the maximum achievable reliable rates for additive and overwrite jamming are characterized as follows. Note that regardless of the coding scheme, the best rate that we can hope for is C z w since the adversary can corrupt any z w links. In the positive-rate regime, this rate is indeed achievable. To achieve it, Alice encodes the message with an erasure code, and overlays it with a pairwise-hashing scheme. Bob uses these hashes to first detect the corrupted links (which are regarded as erasures) and then recovers Alice's message from the transmissions on by the uncorrupted links. However, no coding scheme (including pairwise-hashing) works for the zero-rate regime. The adversary can always adopt a "symmetrization" strategy so that the decoder is unable to distinguish between the correct message and a fake message. The proof of this symmetirzability relies on a "stochastic Singleton bound" that we present in detail in [15] .
Unequal link capacities: To cause maximum damage, the adversary may choose links with the highest sum-rate to attack. We define the the total capacity of any subset of size s links as ⇤ s . Different choices of subsets may result in different values of ⇤ s . The notation (⇤ s ) max denotes the largest sum-capacity of all possible subsets of size s. Similar to the situation with equal link capacities, here also we use erasure codes overlaid with a "pairwise-hashing" scheme. One difference is that the maximum rate depends on Calvin's ability to corrupt the links with largest sum-capacities. The converse for the positive-rate regime (for both additive and overwrite jamming) follows from the standard information-theoretic inequalities, where we use the secrecy condition that any subset of z r = (z rw +z ro ) links cannot carry any meaningful information. In the achievable scheme, Alice needs to mix her message with z r random keys and then use the reliable encoding scheme consisting of pairwise hashing and erasure coding. For the zero-rate regime, the converse is based on Singleton-type arguments as above (see [15] ).
C. Reliability with passive feedback
We now examine the effect of passive feedback on the capacity under both additive and overwrite jamming. The parameter space again decomposes into two parts -the weak adversary regime and strong adversary regime.
The main idea for achievability of the claimed rate in the weak adversary regime is to use a two-round code. The first round involves sending a code that can handle up to z rw + z wo erasures. At the end of the first round, Alice sees the codewords received by Bob and determines the links which have been corrupted. In the next round, Alice sends a random hash of all the received codewords by Bob on the uncorrupted links from first round. Bob can then check the received values from the second round to determine the links where the hash values do not match the received codeword and treat those links as erasures. This scheme works as long as there is at least one link whose output is not seen by Calvin, or he does not have the power to symmetrize Alice's transmission. This corresponds exactly to the condition for the weak adversary in the following theorems. If Calvin is able to see or control the output of all the links and symmetrize Alice's transmission, he is as powerful as Alice and feedback no longer helps. 
